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et al.: First Department
DUE PROCESS

1997]

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
1 58
T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health
(decided Dec. 5, 1996)

Plaintiffs brought this action against defendant, New York
State Office of Mental Health [hereinafter "OMH'], to challenge
the constitutionality of defendant's regulations for acquiring
consent in human subject research under both the Federal1 59 and
New York State 160 Constitutions. 16 1 The Appellate Division,
First Department, affirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of
the State of New York and held that OMH's failure "to provide
adequate notice and review procedures" not only violated the
Federal and New York State Constitutions, but common law and
numerous health and social services laws as well. 162
OMI- is charged with promulgating and enforcing regulations
for patients who are involuntarily mentally institutionalized and
"adjudicated mentally incapable of giving or withholding
informed consent."163 The OMH's stated "purpose is to ensure
the protection of patients who participate in research while, at the
same time, facilitating research into the very disorders from
which they suffer and which underlie their impairment." 164
When patients participate in these types of research projects,
OMH must provide adequate practices for determining mental

158. 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (lst Dep't 1996).
159. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "[Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law .... " Id.
160. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. This provision provides in pertinent part:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law." Id.
161. T.D., 650 N.Y.S.2d at 186-87.
162. Id. at 194.
163. Id. at 177.
164. Id. at 175 (quoting N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14.

§ 527.10(b) (1995)).
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capacity and obtaining consent. 16 5 At the very least, OMH must
provide adequate constitutional safeguards for the patients who
may be potential subjects of these research projects.166
Specifically, the focus in this case was on patients who were
"children and adults deemed incapable of giving or withholding

consent for participation in experiments involving more than
16 7

minimal risk."
The Appellate Division, First Department, responded to
plaintiffs' contention that they are protected under the United
States Constitution, more specifically the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause. 16 8 The Appellate Division observed that
the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
an incarcerated inmate may be forced, without his consent, into
taking anti-psychotic medication. In the landmark case of
Washington v. Harper,169 relied on by the appellate division, the
United States Supreme Court held that a prison inmate does not
surrender his due process rights even though he may be
165. Id. at 185. The requisite capacity necessary for a patient to validly
consent to medical treatment is defined as "the patient's ability to understand
the purpose, nature, risks, benefits and alternatives (including nonparticipation) of the research, to make a decision about participation, and to
understand that decision about participation in the research will involve no
penalty or loss of benefits to which the patient is otherwise entitled." N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 527. 10(c)(2) (1995).
166. T.D., 650 N.Y.S.2d at 185 (noting that especially when experiments
offer little or no benefit to the patient, informed consent must be obtained).
See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2442 (McKinney 1993). This section provides
in part that "[n]o human research may be conducted in this state in the absence
of the voluntary informed consent subscribed to in writing by the human
subject." Id.
167. T.D., 650 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
168. Id. at 186.
169. T.D., 650 N.Y.S.2d at 186. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210
(1990). In Washington, an inmate was incarcerated in a state penitentiary
where he acquiesced to the administration of anti-psychotic medication. Id. at
213. When respondent later refused to continue the treatment, the state sought
to medicate him over his objection. Id. The Court held that the prison's
procedures of providing medical treatment were constitutionally within the
requirements of due process largely due to the presence of "notice, right to be
present at an adversary hearing, and the right to present and cross-examine
witnesses." Id. at 235.
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incarcerated. 17 0 More specifically, an inmate retains the right to
refuse the administration of anti-psychotic medication. 17 1 The

Court, however, carved out the following two exceptions for
situations in which a mentally ill inmate may have to submit to

treatment of anti-psychotic drugs against his will: (1) where the

prisoner represents a danger to himself or to others; and (2)
where the treatment is in the prisoner's best interest. 17 2

More

importantly, the Court recognized the importance of adequate
hearing procedures established by correction officials. 17 3 The
Court determined that in order for a prison to administer anti-

psychotic medication to an inmate against his will, it must fulfill
numerous substantive and procedural processes established to

protect the constitutional right of the prisoner. 174

Two years

later, in Riggins v. Nevada, 17 5 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its
previous decision in Washington by holding that "forcing anti-

psychotic drugs on a convicted prisoner is impermissible absent a

170. Id. at 229.
171. Id. The Court stated that "[t]he forcible injection of medication into a
non-consenting person's body represents a substantial interference with that
person's liberty." Id. (citations omitted).
172. Id. at 227.
173. Id. at 233. "A State's attempt to set a high standard for determining
when involuntary medication with anti-psychotic drugs is permitted cannot
withstand [a constitutional] challenge if there are no procedural safeguards to
ensure the prisoner's interests are taken into account." Id.
174. Id. at 227.
175. 504 U.S. 127 (1992). In Riggins, petitioner was prescribed antipsychotic drugs while awaiting trial for murder. Id. at 129. After he was
adjudicated as being mentally competent to stand trial, he submitted a motion
to the court requesting that his medication be suspended during the course of
the trial, based on the assertion that the Fourteenth Amendment "infringed
upon his freedom and that the drugs' effect on his demeanor and mental state
during the trial would deny him due process." Id. at 130. Petitioner's motion
was denied and he was convicted of murder and robbery and sentenced to
death. Id. at 131. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and
petitioner appealed. Id. at 132. The United States Supreme Court reversed
and held that a due process violation occurs when a "record contains no
finding that might support a conclusion that administration of anti-psychotic
medication was necessary to accomplish an essential state policy .... " Id. at
138.
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finding of overriding justification and a determination of medical
6
appropriateness." 17
Relying on the Court's previous decisions in Washington
and Riggins, the Appellate Division, First Department, stated that
in order for the New York State regulations to withstand
constitutional scrutiny, they must, at a minimum, provide the
patient with specific provisions for notice. 177 Therefore, an
evaluation must be conducted in order to determine the patient's
mental capacity coupled with appropriate administrative and
judicial review procedures established to determine the requisite
capacity. 178 The key to determining capacity, or lack thereof, is
central in determining whether a patient must submit to the
medical research. 179 The Institutional Review Board [hereinafter
"IRB"] is charged with the responsibility of reviewing consent
procedures and determining a patient's requisite mental capacity
to consent. 180

However, constitutional problems arise when the IRB,
regardless of whether a patient may lack capacity to give an
informed consent, "has the authority to require that an
assessment of the patient[s] capacity be made by a person or
persons who are not affiliated with the research and/or who have
specific qualifications and/or certifications." 181 Specifically, the
IRB may override a patient's consent if it determines that there
are direct health benefits to the patient available only through this
type of medical research. 182 Where capacity is not present, the
IRB may obtain two independent evaluations of capacity of
consent.183 The independent evaluations are then submitted to
176. Id. at 135.
177. T.D., 650 N.Y.S.2d at 187.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 527.10(e)(2)(ii) (1995).
182. N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. & REGS. tit. 14, 527.10(d)(6). This section
provides in pertinent part: "[R]esearch which involves patients who lack the
capacity to consent may not be approved unless the IRB has determined and
documented ....
[that it] involves no more than minimal risk and/or invasive
procedures ....
"Id.
183. T.D., 650 N.Y.S.2d at 188.
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the clinical director who makes the final determination of the
patient's capacity. 184 Once the patient is adjudicated to be
incapable of consenting to the treatment, consent may be obtained
by a wide range of other people. 185
The T.D. court found that the above mentioned procedural
safeguards do not adequately protect the patient's due process and
privacy rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution. 186
Specifically, the court made the
following findings:
The regulations do not identify or set out specific or even
minimum qualifications for the individual or individuals who
initially access a potential subject's capacity .... [T]here are no
provisions requiring any notice to the patient that his or her
capacity to provide or withhold consent for a particular study is
being questioned ....

[and] there is no provision for review of a

187
determination of lack of capacity at the patient's request.

In addition, a patient's request to review the decision of his or
her mental capacity and the surrogate's approval of the medical
188
treatment and is not likely to be reviewed.
Turning to the New York State Constitution, the
Appellate Division, First Department relied on the principal case
of Rivers v. Katz 189 which held that the Due Process Clause of
184. Id.
185. Id. See generally, N.Y. COMP. CODES
§ 527.10(e)(2)(iii)(a) (1995) (providing for designation
durable power of attorney); N.Y. COMP. CODES
§ 527.10(e)(2)(iv) (1995) (providing for consent to be
spouse, adult child, sibling);

R. & REGS. lit. 14,
of a party pursuant to a
R. & REGS. tit. 14,
obtained from a parent,

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14.

§ 527.10(c)(3) (1995) (providing that consent can be obtained from a close
friend); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 527.10(e)(3)(i) (1995)

(providing in the case of minors, consent is to be obtained from a parent or
legal guardian or, in the absence of such person, an adult relative qualified to
make medical treatment decisions for the minor).
186. T.D., 650 N.Y.S.2d at 189.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 190.
189. 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986). In Rivers.
the New York Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether involuntarily
committed mental patients have a protected constitutional right to refuse anti-
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the New York State Constitution guarantees the fundamental right
of involuntarily committed mental patients to refuse

medication. 190

In Katz, the New York Court of Appeals

reaffirmed its decision in In Re Storar19 1 which held that an
individual has a common law right to refuse medical treatment,

irrespective of whether such treatment is vital to survival. 192
However, the Rivers court limited the circumstances under which

the state's police power would justify forced medication to times
of imminent danger to the patient themselves, or to others, or
when a compelling state interest is present. 193

State interests

unrelated to the patient's safety or the safety of others could not
outweigh the patient's fundamental right to refuse medication. 194
psychotic medication. Id. at 489-90, 495 N.E.2d at 339, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 76.
The court determined that involuntary commitment is not a sufficient basis to
assume that the patient is incapable of making a reasoned decision regarding
their physical condition. Id. at 493-94, 495 N.E.2d at 341-42, 504 N.Y.S.2d
at 79. Therefore, a patient is entitled to a hearing to determine mental capacity
and prior involuntary medical treatment. Id. at 497, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504
N.Y.S.2d at 81.
The court reasoned that the patient's desires must be
respected "in order to insure that the greatest possible protection he is
accorded is autonomy and freedom from unwanted interference with the
furtherance of his own desires." Id. at 493, 495 N.E.2d at,341, 504 N.Y.S.2d
at 78.
190. Id. at 492, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78 ("[E]very
individual 'of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
be done with his own body.'") (quoting Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y.
Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125,129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)).
191. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (YEAR) (stating
that where a state has a "legitimate interest in protecting the lives of its
citizens," the common law right to refuse medical treatment should yield to the
legitimate state interest), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
192. Id. at 377, 420 N.E.2d at 71, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
193. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 492, 495 N.E.2d at 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
The court went further and rejected "[a]ny implication that State interests
unrelated to the patient's well-being or those around him can outweigh his
fundamental autonomy interest.

. .

."

Id. at 495 n.6, 495 N.E.2d at 343 n.6,

504 N.Y.S. 2d at 80 n.6. Specifically, the court maintained that the
appropriate constitutional inquiry was to "balance the individual's liberty
interest against the State's asserted compelling need on the facts of each case to
determine whether such medication may be forcibly administered." Id. at 498,
495 N.E.2d 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
194. Id. at 495 n.6, 495 N.E.2d at 343 n.6, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 80 n.6.
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In the absence of these type of situations, there must be a judicial
determination that the patient lacks the requisite mental capability
for giving consent. 195 The determination is to be made by the
judiciary, not by a medical professional. 196
The Rivers court determined that administrative
determinations do not adequately safeguard the patient's
fundamental liberty interest guaranteed by Article 1, section 6 of
the New York State Constitution. 197 Determination of capacity to
make informed and reasonable consent must be made at a judicial
hearing and the patient should be afforded legal
representation. 198 However, the Rivers court pointed out, absent
legislation to the contrary and the patient's clear intent,
surrogates may not decide that a patient's health has deteriorated
to the point where treatment is to be discontinued and the patient
should be allowed to die. 199
The Appellate Division, in T.D., rejected the defendants'
argument that a surrogate may make treatment decisions in
research cases. 200 The court maintained that "substantive and
procedural safeguards should be provided to these potential
[greater than minimum risk non-therapeutic] research patients as
1
are provided to patients in life-sustaining treatment settings." 20
It pointed out that the problem with New York's mental health
regulations is that once the patient is deemed incapable of
rendering valid consent, there are instances where the patient's

195. Id. at 497, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d 81.
196. Id. at 496, 495 N.E.2d at 343, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
197. Id. at 498, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81. (holding that "the
regulations do not articulate the standards to be followed or criteria to be
considered at each stage of the administrative process, i.e., what the need is
for the particular drug, whether a particular drug is the least intrusive, whether

it is capable of producing the least serious side effects, and the proper length of
its use.").
198. Id. at 497, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
199. Id. See generally, People v. Eulo, 63 N.Y.2d 341, 357, 472 N.E.2d
286, 296, 482 N.Y.S.2d 436, 446 (1984).
200. T.D., 650 N.Y.S.2d at 191.
201. Id.
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202
objection to participation in the research may be overridden.
These various provisions neither entitle the patient to notice that
their objection is being overridden, nor do they provide for an
adequate opportunity to seek a review of the psychiatrist's
determination. 203 Moreover, the court points out that, because
the "benefit" is left undefined in the regulations, "the benefit
while required to be important to the health or well-being of the
adult or minor patient, is not required to be a product of the
research procedures or even related to the psychiatric condition
Even with new medical
presented by the patient." 204
advancements in the field of psychiatric drugs, the incompetent
patients' rights must be protected against greater than minimum
risk studies through constitutionally mandated procedures enacted
by appropriate administrative agencies.205
In conclusion, the Appellate Division, First Department, found
that lack of notice may lead to the patient not being aware that
he/she is involved in the research. 206 Moreover, the lack of
administrative and judicial review procedures established by
OMH in cases of "non-therapeutic greater than minimal risk
experimentation" failed to protect the patient's constitutionally
guaranteed due process rights under the Federal and New York
State Constitutions. 207

202. Id. at 193.

See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R.- & REGS. tit. 14,

§ 527.10(e)(2)(viii) (1995) (providing instances for overriding the patient's
objection in cases where "a psychiatrist who is not associated with the research
finds and documents that . . . the research holds out a prospect of direct
benefit that is important to the health or well-being of the patient . .. .);
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 527.10(e)(3)(v) (1995) (providing
that "[a] child's objection . . .

must be honored, except when a child's

psychiatrist who is neither employed by the facility nor associated with the
research, finds ... the research ... holds out a prospect of direct benefit, that
is important to the health or well-being of the child. . .
203. T.D., 650 N.Y.S.2d at 193.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 194.
206. Id. at 191.
207. Id. at 192.
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